Category: Law & Justice

Royal Commission: abuse victims need to be helped, not just heard

by Michael Salter

There has been a great deal of focus on the role of a Royal Commission in delivering “justice” for victims of sexual abuse. Justice is a powerful, symbolic principle, and being listened to can be a moving and meaningful experience for survivors. My experience interviewing child abuse survivors suggests the opportunity to tell their story in a validating and comfortable environment can have a range of emotional benefits for them.

However, once the drama of the Royal Commission is over, survivors must return to their day-to-day lives. Some recover well, but many continue to experience high rates of depression, anxiety, substance abuse and suicide. They suffer in silence or are bounced between health and welfare services that are not funded to meet their needs. The worst affected wind up in prison or on the streets.

NSW premier Barry O’Farrell said that sexual abuse has “robbed young children of their futures”. The implication is that the lives of child abuse survivors have been irrevocably compromised and the only substantive action we can take is to prevent abuse from occurring in the first place; once it has happened, it’s too late to do much. This represents the state’s failure to provide adequate health services to child abuse survivors.

Ensuring the quality of life of survivors into the future should be a key focus of the recommendations of the Royal Commission. Safety and justice are fundamental human rights, but so are health and wellbeing. The World Health Organisation defines health as an individual and collective “resource for everyday life”. We build and preserve this resource as a community, first by creating healthy environments in which people can live happily and safely, and second by ensuring that care and support are available.

In both regards, Australia has failed child abuse survivors. They grew up in spaces where they were not safe or protected. Many were not provided with the opportunity to disclose what had happened to them, or when they did, they were ignored. Now, as adults, they find themselves unable to access health care that addresses the impact of trauma and abuse on their lives.

As a result, they are often subject to inappropriate, ineffective or even dangerous forms of treatment that compound the harms of abuse. But effective treatment does exist for child abuse survivors. The fact is that successive governments have not invested in them, made them available or provided enough abuse-specific training to the health workforce.

Royal Commissions have the power and scope to address systemic policy issues. The prevention, detection and reporting of child abuse is one such issue. Providing and ensuring access to effective mental health care in the aftermath of abuse is the other side of the coin – and it has long been neglected. Child abuse is at the very centre of the burden of mental illness in the community. Until steps are taken to address the health needs of survivors, this burden will remain, at a significant financial cost to the community, not to mention the personal cost to survivors, their friends and families.

When it comes to child abuse, justice, safety and health are inextricably linked. Children protected from abuse are less vulnerable to mental illness. Where they are abused, early detection and intervention can result in better outcomes for the child, and the identification of offenders and protection of other children.

For those victims enduring the long-term impacts of abuse, however, real justice must deliver more than the symbolic opportunity to attest to their victimisation. It must provide them with access to the care and support that has previously been denied them.

This is one of the main challenges that faces the Royal Commission and, in my view, if this challenge is not addressed then the current rhetoric about justice and safety will remain just that – rhetoric.

Michael Salter is a lecturer in criminology at the University of Western Sydney.

This article was first published at www.theconversation.edu.au

 

Loud thunder, little rain: China’s new leaders target corruption

by Kenneth Chern

China’s new leaders are aware of the danger that corruption poses to the nation’s social stability and economic development.

But entrenched corruption at the local and national levels, including among the families and friends of those very leaders, will make it difficult for them to break the link between money and power that frustrates the masses but sustains the power of a Communist Party that long ago abandoned political belief for economic gain.

A 2007 report of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace by Minxin Pei called the level of Chinese corruption “astonishing,” noting that it cost $US86 billion a year, more than China’s annual education budget. Things have not gotten any better. The Bo Xilai affair – Bo’s wiretapping of other top Chinese leaders, his son’s privileged lifestyle abroad, and his wife’s murder conviction — was but the most lurid case of rampant corruption that has shaken the trust of the Chinese people in their government.

Other high-profile cases have left the public seething: the melamine-laced milk that poisoned hundreds of infants; the Wenchuan earthquake that toppled “tofu schoolhouses” onto pupils while government buildings stood firm; the bullet train crash in Wenzhou that disgraced railway czar Liu Zhijun; and the sale by Wukan officials of prized farmland to real estate developers that triggered villager demonstrations and violence.

In his speech to the 18th Party Congress last week, outgoing President Hu Jintao stressed the need to fight corruption, warning that if the issue is not addressed, “it could prove fatal to the party, and even cause the collapse of the party and the fall of the state.” Significantly, he warned leading officials to “strengthen education and discipline over their family and staff.” Along the same lines, incoming Party general secretary Xi Jinping in 2004 instructed, “Rein in your spouses, children, relatives, friends and staff, and vow not to use power for personal gain.”

But Chinese leaders have made similar warnings for years without making serious headway. That’s because of what Kenneth Lieberthal of the Brookings Institution terms the “marriage of wealth and political power” which supports an economic strategy based on rewards to local officials for “producing rapid GDP growth while keeping a lid on social unrest.” Put another way, the breakneck speed of Chinese economic development provides wealth that is distributed as patronage and provides support for the Party’s continued political monopoly. And campaigns against corruption evoke the Chinese proverb, “Loud thunder, little rain.”

More specifically, Minxin Pei cites two characteristics of corruption — the corruption of local state institutions through the purchase and sale of government appointments, and “collusion among local ruling elites” or “groups of local officials who cooperate and protect each other.” These practices drain the economy and feed public cynicism but they nurture the political and economic ambitions of entrepreneurs and government officials who thrive in a poorly defined regulatory and policy environment.

This is the social context in which Chinese leaders and their families operate, which is why the calls of Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping for discipline of families and staff is so interesting. Politicians, their relatives, staff, and friends use their political clout to build businesses and line their pockets. The average wealth of the richest 70 members of the National People’s Congress in 2011 was over US$1 billion. China’s central bank reportedly has evidence that up to 18,000 officials and employees of state-owned firms have fled China since the mid-1990s, taking $127 billion with them.

And recent reports have shown how relatives of top Chinese officials have grown wealthy. Xi himself reportedly has sisters and brothers-in-law with “huge interests in China’s real estate, minerals and telecommunications sectors.” And the family of Premier Wen Jiabao, perhaps the strongest reform advocate of all China’s top leaders, has been reported by the New York Times to have US$2.7 billion in wealth.

The reality is that Chinese leaders, even those who call for (and may sincerely believe in) reform and a crackdown on corruption, find themselves in a social web of political influence and enrichment that sustains the status quo. That reality will make it just as hard for the new leaders as it was for their predecessors to make a serious tilt at corruption.

Corruption and influence peddling are as old as the Chinese nation, and as old as human history. What is new is the demand of poor farmers, workers, and China’s growing middle class for a level playing field and a fairer chance for opportunity. Growing social tensions and environmental stresses make the current system unsustainable for the long term.

How Ji Xinping and the new Politburo meet that test will determine history’s verdict on whether they are authentic leaders with the courage to take the needed steps for the common good of the Chinese people and the welfare of the Chinese nation.

Kenneth Chern is Professor of Asian Policy at the Swinburne University of Technology and Executive Director of the Swinburne Leadership Institute.

This article was first published at www.theconversation.edu.au

 

R18+ rating added for videogames … but are children protected?

New guidelines for the classification of videogames have been released by Federal Home Affairs Minister Jason Clare and, despite being a step in the right direction, the revisions are largely disappointing and a missed opportunity.

The Guidelines for the Classification of Computer Games – which were revised to account for the introduction of an R18+ classification – are an important step towards the enhanced protection of minors which has been held out as a result of the reform.

Under the existing system, the highest legal classification a game can be given is MA15+. This year the Parliament has amended the law to allow an R18+ classification, in response to community concerns that the strong, contextually justified violence available in MA15+ was not suitable for anybody under 18. However it was necessary to change the guidelines to ensure that level of violence would no longer be available at MA15+.

While the revised guidelines show an obvious intent to meet community expectations about enhanced protection for minors – by tightening up the level of violence permissible at MA15+ – there was a disappointing lack of public consultation during their creation.

Instead the draft guidelines were simply placed on a website, with no proper call for public comment. As the guidelines are more important to the policy aim than the introduction of the new classification, consultation on them should have been at least as widely publicised.

Nor does there appear to have been any proper legislative drafting process; rather the guidelines were passed around for individual ministers to make their own changes and additions.

The result is a patch-up job with minimal substantive changes. Worse, some of the wording is awkward and unclear.

The test for sexual violence at the R18+ level, for instance, stretches logic by distinguishing between “implied sexual violence” which is “visually depicted”, and that which is not visually depicted.

The guidelines go on to state that the classification does not permit implied sexual violence that is visually depicted if it is “interactive, not justified by context or related to incentives or rewards”. I doubt any self-respecting legislative drafter would have mixed up positives and negatives in this way.

The new guidelines also contain a restriction on depictions of “actual” sexual activity, thereby failing to recognise that nothing in a game is “actual”. The word, I imagine, was chosen to make a distinction from depictions of “implied” sexual activity, but if this was the case, a drafter would have known that the appropriate word would have been “explicit”.

Perhaps more importantly, the new guidelines contain more changes on sexual activity, nudity and drug use than they do on violence. It was violence driving the push for an R18+ classification in the first place and violence should have been central to the changes.

Rather, the violence-related changes come across as an afterthought; for example, all classification levels contain changes relating to sex, drugs and nudity but the criteria for non-sexual violence change only at G and MA15+. The dominance of the sex-related changes, in my view, further entrenches the classification system as one based on moralistic concerns rather than the clear evidence about what can influence children’s development in detrimental ways.

I have been disappointed (but not surprised) to see a renewal of claims by the gaming industry of an absence of evidence violent interactive games (by demanding active engagement) can have a stronger influence on users than film (which demands only passive engagement).

Interactive games may not have been around long enough for there to be conclusive evidence about enhanced impact through interactivity, but as this UNICEF Multigrade Teacher’s Handbook reminds us, we do have plenty of evidence that children learn better by doing than by watching, especially through repetition and rewards.

The analogy to interactive and passive media experiences is powerful enough to justify a different approach to the classification of games.

Of course the comments sections of articles and online forums are still full of pundits protesting about an alleged lack of evidence that violent media of any kind can have an influence on its users.

These claims sound strange coming at the end of a lengthy campaign for an R18+ classification that was driven by hand-wringing about all the inappropriate material currently available to minors at MA15+.

I’ve yet to meet anyone who disagrees some games are inappropriate for minors – the problem is that some people are happy to reach that conclusion based on a moralistic assessment of the material, or on gut-feeling and guesswork, or on the intent of the developer, rather than on the weight of the scientific evidence that exists as to how violent media can influence people’s thoughts, attitudes and behaviour.

People who weigh in to the debate over the appropriate role of this evidence in policy formation nearly always presume that the main, or only, question is whether violent media begets violent behaviour. In doing so they overlook the more subtle but potentially widespread influences on thoughts and especially attitudes.

Desensitisation to violence is at least as big a concern for the future of our society as increased tendencies to aggressive behaviour. Possibly more so because, while parents and carers have some opportunity to notice and address behavioural changes, attitudinal ones might go unnoticed and unchecked until it is too late.

The revised guidelines for videogames are another lost opportunity for a root-and-branch, considered review to base the classification system on the science, rather than on guesswork and moral judgment.

If we are going to have a classification system based on the wide recognition that media content can be harmful to minors, it’s imperative that we take seriously the evidence about what is harmful, and build the criteria around that.

Elizabeth Handsley is aProfessor of Law at Flinders University.

This article was originally published online at The Conversation.

Breivik court verdict: security lessons?

by Robert Lambert 

Now that the legal question of Anders Breivik’s sanity has been resolved it should be possible to focus more closely on his political motivation and the security lessons that arise from this case. This should help inform a debate about how best to tackle the growing problem of far right violence in Europe and the US

Today Anders Breivik’s trial came to a conclusion when he was found to be sane and sentenced to a maximum twenty one years in prison. Previously two teams of court-appointed psychiatrists who examined Breivik had reached opposite conclusions. The first said that he was a paranoid schizophrenic, and the second assessed him to be sane.

As the psychiatrist Tad Tietse noted in respect of the first report, it may have told us ‘more about the socially embedded nature of psychiatric diagnosis and the prevailing political climate in Norway than any claim it was the result of some kind of cold, hard, value-free science’. Be that as it may, it is to be hoped that if and when the next serious case of far right terrorism takes place in Europe or the US, governments, police and judiciary will have a better grasp of the political rationale that drives it irrespective of the mental profile(s) of the individual perpetrator(s).

To express the same point on a different premise:  it is to be hoped that far right terrorists will in the future be treated the same as all other terrorists. Whether they operate as ‘lone wolves’ (or ‘solo terrorists’) their far right political affiliations (like Breivk’s prior membership of the Progress Party) should not be lightly disregarded.

Notably, the legal and medical fixation with Breivik’s mental health followed an immediate interest in the same topic by political commentators determined to deny a political terrorist motivation for Breivik’s violence.

Such a strong focus on the mental wellbeing of the accused is unusual in a case of political terrorism. That said, cases of political terrorism are rare in Norway and it is probable that the psychiatrists in the case lacked experience of examining politically motivated individuals like Breivik. Unfamiliarity with political violence might help explain a failure on the part of the first team of psychiatrists to grasp the significance of Breivik’s lengthy manifesto 2083 – A European Declaration of Independence - a document he circulated to hundreds of contacts that helps reveal the extent to which he was influenced by a global anti-Muslim movement known as the Counter Jihad Movement.

Significantly, the counter-jihad movement contains commentators who are notoriously quick to link a handful of al-Qaeda terrorist attacks in Europe and the US to what they call the ideology of radical Islam or Islamism (or sometimes Islam itself). In fact, the links (in terms of a shared political ideology) may be much closer between prominent members of the counter jihad movement and Breivik than between most al-Qaeda terrorists and many mainstream Muslims who are regularly and pejoratively stigmatised as fellow travellers or closet supporters of al-Qaeda by the counter jihad movement.

It should not be left to Breivik to explain and promote his political motivation and his political campaign from his prison cell. Now is the time to expose it, discern its proximity to the counter jihad movement and, at some points, its alarming appropriation of mainstream discourse on Islamism, Muslims and immigration. To hide instead behind the legalities of sanity and insanity serves Breivik’s victims – and the unknown or unremarked victims of countless acts of lesser political violence against Muslims, ethnic minorities, immigrants and their allies – very poorly indeed.

Duty to the victims and the bereaved

The overwhelming majority of Anders Breivik’s victims were young, left wing activists who would still be alive today if their killer had not taken his attachment to far right politics to such a lethal conclusion. While their bereaved parents, siblings, relatives and friends are bound to be relieved that Breivik has finally been brought to justice at least some will, in addition, be eager to understand why and how he carried out his violent acts as part of their difficult bereavement journeys.

For some it may be comforting to witness the overwhelming majority of their fellow citizens standing steadfastly against a significant minority of far right bigots. But political terrorists like Breivik are always a tiny minority (within a much larger community of like minded activists) who will seek to conceal their preparations so as to avoid detection prior to carrying out their criminal attacks. Therefore, for all that is positive and effective in ‘open confrontation with right-wing bloggers and activists’ as a ‘strategy to combat [far right] extremism’ it is also necessary to tackle far right terrorism and political violence as effectively as any other kind, including that which is carried out or threatened by Muslim extremists, generally under an al-Qaeda banner .

Police failings

Just weeks before the verdict was announced, an official report highlighted police failings that may have prevented Breivik being arrested shortly after his first bomb attack against a government building in Oslo and before he landed on Utoya Island to carry out a shooting spree. The report also highlighted a separate police failure to arrive on Utoya Island as speedily as possible and thereby bring an earlier halt to the killing.

The second of these two failures revolved around a decision by police officers to wait for expert colleagues before taking a ferry to Utoya Island – a disturbing scenario that suggests a negative example of ‘health and safety’ culture overruling a fundamental police commitment to public safety. As a result Norway’s police chief Oeystein Maeland resigned from his post.

Less explicit, the report suggested that ‘with better ways of working and a broader focus, the police security service could have become aware of the perpetrator prior to 22 July’. This might well be taken to refer to missed intelligence opportunities to monitor Breivik after he purchased ingredients for his bomb. It is hard to imagine that such a failure would have occurred if Breivik had instead been an identifiable Muslim purchasing the same ingredients in the same circumstances.

The report was oddly silent on Breivik’s far right political motivation saying instead that it had ‘foregone issues related to the perpetrator’s motive….’ and intriguingly, that it had ‘not explored the measures society puts in place for the early prevention of radicalisation’.

Far right radicalisation

How might the ‘early prevention of radicalisation’ relate to Breivik’s case? Had Breivik been a member or associate of a white supremacist or neo-Nazi organisation it is reasonably safe to assume that he would have been actively monitored by police and police security services. Instead, Breivik was able to take advantage of the fact that his prior membership of the Progress Party and his wide engagement with the counter jihad movement was apparently not regarded as evidence of ‘extremism’ or as a basis for reasonable suspicion in his activities.

There are numerous examples of how ‘the new far right’ has successfully re-invented itself and created sufficient distance from ‘the old far right’ so as to become immune to pro-active police and security investigation. In the UK, for example, government and police have steadfastly refused to cast the English Defence League (EDL) in the role of ‘extremists’ despite a growing catalogue of violence carried out by its members and supporters. In consequence EDL (and their counter-jihad counterparts across Europe and the US) are considered as more of a public order or social cohesion problem than a counter-terrorist or political violence issue. As a result they are not considered as suitable for ‘counter-radicalisation’ strategies in the way that supposedly ‘radical’ Muslims often are.

Instead, in Norway, across Europe and the US, ‘the early prevention of radicalisation’ has come to denote intrusive strategies that are aimed at individual Muslims who are suspected or deemed to be at risk of radicalisation into violent (or increasingly non violent) Muslim extremism (which includes terrorism inspired or directed by al–Qaeda). The UK has been a leader in this field of work and while some work carried out under the Prevent umbrella has been narrowly and effectively focused on terrorism and violent extremism other strands of work has been ineffective and counter-productive by virtue of being too broadly cast against politically active Muslims who pose no threat to security or social cohesion.

It is far from certain that any of Anders Breivik’s victims – particularly those members of AUF (Labour Youth) killed on Utoya Island who he regarded as prime targets – would be alive today if their killer had received psychiatric treatment or counselling during the months he was planning his acts of terrorism. In contrast, it is safe to assume that the AUF summer camp of 2011 would have reached a peaceful non-violent conclusion if Breivik had not become influenced by the Counter Jihad Movement. So rather than medical help did Breivik need political counselling?

This is not an idle thought. In neighbouring Sweden, for example, there is an experienced street based group in Stockholm called Exit run by former far right activists that helps individuals disengage from far right politics and far right violence. Admittedly, Breivik was not as visibly engaged in far right politics as some Exit clients but if he had been subject to closer security monitoring it is entirely feasible that he could have been ear marked for such an intervention.

Even handed counter-terrorism policy

However, so long as the disparate elements of the counter jihad movement in particular, and the new far right movement in general, are wrongly treated as somehow representing a lesser threat of extremism and violence than their less sophisticated neo-Nazi colleagues in the old far right we will fail to tackle the motivation for both Breivik’s actions and hundreds of acts of lesser political violence that have gone largely unremarked during the last decade.

It is of course vital not to infringe the civil liberties of far right activists and counter jihad activists unless there is compelling evidence of the kind that might have arisen during Breivik’s long period of terrorist preparation and planning. That said, it is equally vital that governments and law enforcement agencies do not show sensitivity to the civil rights of the far right and the counter jihad movement while disregarding the civil rights of politically active Muslims. From now on there needs to be an even handed counter-terrorism policy in Europe and the US.

Robert Lambert is Lecturer at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, University of St Andrews. He is the author of Countering al-Qaeda in London: Police and Muslims in Partnership, Hurst, London in September 2011.

This article was first published at Open Democracy / Open Security

Homicides, homosexual advances and male honour: will NSW act on provocation law?

by Thomas Crofts and  Stephen Tomsen

Murder is the most serious of all violent crimes, and needs a determined criminal justice response. If there are circumstances in which a killing might be seen as wholly or partly excusable, then this is of interest to all citizens – particularly if these circumstances weigh unevenly against a specific social group.

Provocation is a defence that signals reduced culpability for an intentional killing by replacing a murder conviction with one of manslaughter. Historically it differentiated killings worthy of the death penalty from less heinous killings committed “in the heat of passion” without premeditation.

This was linked to a tradition of male social honour, a breach of which tended to provoke an angry response. Behaviour seen by criminal courts in the past as an affront to male honour included insults arising from drunken fights or a wife’s adultery. Unfortunately, the latter situation is still seen by some, such as Christian lobby group FamilyVoice Australia, to be an acceptable defence to murder today. The perpetuation of such views is partly the reason why provocation has been subject to so much criticism and why some jurisdictions have abolished provocation.

An affront to male honour which in recent decades has been used to argue a case of provocation is the so-called “homosexual advance defence” (HAD), sometimes incorrectly referred to as the “gay panic” defence (which is actually a failed US version of the defence strategy).

Since the 1990s, gay and lesbian activists have expressed serious concerns about homicide cases in which an accused male killer or killers pleads provocation on the basis of an alleged unwanted sexual advance from the victim who was known or assumed to be homosexual.

The argument is that a man who is the subject of an unwanted sexual pass by another man finds this so provoking that he loses self-control and kills. According to the law, if an “ordinary” person could have reacted the way that the offender did by losing their self-control in the face of victim’s behaviour, then the charge of murder will be reduced to manslaughter.

This strategy relies on negative courtroom depictions of the homosexual victim. The logic is that the perpetrator is a “regular” masculine man or youth whose goodwill is pushed to the limit by being propositioned or even sexually touched by a homosexual “nuisance”.

The use of this defence strategy in the NSW case of Green v The Queen in the 1990s reached all the way to the most senior judges in the land. A majority ruling by the Australian High Court favourably viewed the accused killer’s appeal against a murder conviction and paved the way for his eventual securing of a much lighter sentence for manslaughter.

The Green case was subject to much criticism because the court allowed claims of a homosexual advance to substantiate a claim of provocation. In reaching this decision the majority of these judges did not take the opportunity to rule that no ordinary person could be provoked to kill by a non-violent sexual pass. In fact, several comments were made which suggested that such extreme violence may often be expected.

The High Court result in Green mobilised gay and lesbian lobbyists nationwide. It spurred an official Attorney-General’s Working Party Inquiry in NSW which in 1998 recommended that a non-violent sexual advance should be barred from forming the basis of a provocation defence. Nothing came of those recommendations.

More general feminist opposition to provocation because of the way in which it has traditionally privileged male violence and not worked for females has to an extent been more successful and led to provocation being abolished in Victoria, Tasmania and Western Australia.

Other jurisdictions have retained the defence of provocation but amended it with the aim of removing its more problematic aspects. For example, amendments in the ACT and Northern Territory bar the use of provocation on the basis of a non-violent sexual advance. Queensland also retains provocation but bars the defence of provocation in response to the ending or changing of a domestic relationship. Parallel to this reduction in the scope of provocation Queensland has also introduced a specific defence of killing for preservation in an abusive domestic relationship.

The result of these changes is that NSW and Queensland are the only jurisdictions that still retain provocation and have no legislative bar against provocation claims based on a sexual advance (in South Australia provocation is a common law defence and is not found in statute). Two recent cases in Queensland in which provocation was used successfully to reduce charges from murder to manslaughter have once again ignited concern about allowing the defence on the basis of sexual advance.

The ensuing campaign for change led to the creation of a working party in 2011 to examine the operation of the homosexual advance defence and a government pledge to amend the Queensland Criminal Code to, in the words of the former Attorney-General Paul Lucas:

make it crystal clear that someone making a pass at someone is not grounds for a partial defence and by no means an excuse for horribly violent acts.

But a change in government means there is now no commitment for reform in Queensland, as stated by the current Attorney-General, Jarrod Bleijie.

Meanwhile, things might be about to change in NSW. In the fifteen years since the Attorney-General’s Working Party recommended changes to the law, successive governments have reneged on their promises of reform or ignored this issue. Now, however, a select committee has been established to inquire into provocation in NSW, and is currently accepting submissions.

This review was sparked by the case of Chamanjot Singh, who was sentenced to six years imprisonment after being found guilty of manslaughter rather than murder of his wife on the basis that he had been provoked by verbal abuse.

It remains to be seen whether NSW will join Tasmania, Victoria and Western Australia in abolishing provocation outright, or whether it will make amendments to remove more controversial elements such as its use in HAD claims.

What sort of signals about male interaction and violence does the legal status of the homosexual advance defence send to men and boys? If the answer to this question suggests physical and even fatal violence as the acceptable response, rather than a simple declaration of non-interest, then we should consider why our society would not tolerate a similar violent reaction from women who are subjected to routine unwanted overtures from men.

The ongoing failure to scrap the homosexual advance defence and the partial excuse it provides to certain forms of male violence is an embarrassment and an injustice for the citizens of Queensland and NSW.

The politicians of NSW now have the chance to change this and we should all hope they do not fail a second time.

Thomas Crofts, Associate Professor, Sydney Law School at University of Sydney and  Stephen Tomsen, Professor of Criminology at University of Western Sydney

First published on-line in The Conversation


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